countries are also among the least developed of the developing nations.2
They also grapple with a series of destabilizing developments including disintegrative ethnicity, primordialism or nationalism, predicated upon demands for ethnic self-determination. This leads to the question of whether this is a new phenomenon peculiar to the Horn of Africa or a world-wide trend.
In 1904, for instance, Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), confidently assured the citizens of Birmingham that the day of small nations was over. But 16 years later, contrary to his prediction, some 42 nationsmost of which were new and small, showed up in Geneva and joined the League of Nations. Seventy-two years later, however, some of these nations are disintegrating. One of them, Yugoslavia, for example, has become a metaphor for the collapse of a multi-ethnic state and for the balkanization of the Balkans. It is rapidly disintegrating into its small constituent nationalism such as Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and promises to split even further into still smaller groups like Kosovo, Voivodina and others, which in turn, are demanding their own autonomy.
Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an imagined political community that is inherently limited. Many 'old nations' once thought fully Consolidated, find themselves challenged by 'sub'-nationalisms within their borders-nationalisms which, naturally dream of shedding their sub-ness one day. The progression is quite plain: the end of the era of nationalism, so long prophesied, is not in sight. Indeed, nation-ness has become the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time. Nation, nationality, nationalism-all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze. In contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is conspicuously meager.3
If Anderson finds difficulty in defining nationalism, and rightly so, Clifford Geertz focuses on "developing" countries and argues that the central problem for many people in these countries is that the primordial group is the unit with which they identify, through which their values and beliefs are transmitted and which, in a very real sense, makes life meaningful to them. At times, indeed, the primordial group is the terminal one, representing the major unit of socially legitimate and effective authority. Thus, primordial groups in developing countries may sometimes stand for "totalities of life."4 This observation may also be equally valid for the Western world. How else are we to explain the conflicts in Quebec, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Corsica, Brittany, or among the
Basques (Euskadi), Walloons and Flemings?
On the other hand, Eric Hobsbawn provides what could perhaps be described as an insightful and illuminating study. He maintains that no satisfactory criteria can be discovered as to which one of the many human collectivities should be utilized to understand ethnicity. Such criteria as languages and common territory, he says, are themselves fuzzy and ambiguous. They can change and shift in time. Development in the modern world economy generates vast population movements. As a result, it constantly undermines ethnic-linguistic homogeneity. Indeed, we could even add that since all aspects of cultural pluralism and transmission are constantly in a state of flux, the resultant effect is that each group and society itself continually evolves or changes. In the process, some groups are assimilated, others form, and still others grow larger. Hobsbawn equally questions the utility of what is called "national consciousness" because the great majority of the masses, especially workers and peasants, are the last to be affected by it.5
Insofar as there are no antagonistic contradictions dividing peasants or workers belonging to one ethnic group from workers and peasants of other ethnic groups, could we then say that "ethnicity" and "nationalism" is simply a pre-occupation of marginalized and alienated intellectuals who seek to use it as a political leverage to achieve power? If this is a valid argument, we could raise two questions: To what extent do the problems of resource allocation within the state interact with political, ideological and administrative problems and pass for ethnic conflicts? To what extent would the co-optation of the alienated elite by the state promote stability and unity?
The majority of the nations of the world are ethnically heterogeneous. In fact, there are only a few ethnically and linguistically homogeneous states among the 1 70 of the world's political entities and probably none that include anything like the totality of the "nation." Nevertheless, at a time when some 20 states that have become members of the United Nations have a population of less than 250,000, the argument that a territory is far too small to constitute a state can no longer be convincingly maintained. Such states, of course-even much larger ones-are not independent in any meaningful sense. Politically and militarily they are helpless without outside protection, as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Chad, Somalia, Djibouti, and others have shown. Economically, they are even more dependent. Few would-be state-builders in such territories hope to go it alone. It appears that they want to exchange dependence on a single state economy for dependence on a larger economic unit which can only limit its sovereignty just as much.6
But why should anyone wish to set up such states, mostly by breaking up existing political units? The usual reason given by would-be statebuilders is that the people of the territory concerned have "constituted" a "nation" from the beginning of time; that they are a special ethnic group, with their own languages, culture and history; or that they cannot live under the "domination" and "exploitation" of "strangers." The right of self-determination, they argue, implies the establishment of states that coincide with nations.7 Invariably, they reinforce their arguments by referring to thinkers like John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who contends that ethnically homogeneous states are more likely to be democratic, stable, and viable than multi-ethnic states.
The fact that ethnic differences exist within a state cannot by itself be a sufficient reason for ethnic conflicts to occur. Historical memories may be more crucial than ethnic differences for the maintenance of peace and stability. Conflicts can consistently occur even in societies where no marked linguistic, religious, or ethnic differences exist. In Somalia, for example, the great majority of the people of that country speak one language called Somali and adhere to Sunni Islam.8 Yet, this "oneness" has neither prevented one of the bloodiest civil wars in contemporary Africa nor the disintegration of that country from occurring. Former British Somaliland/Northern Somalia, is now the independent state of "Somaliland." In contrast, many multi-ethnic and multi-religious states like Singapore, Thailand, Switzerland, and Malaysia hold together. How can this be explained?
There have been many studies that claim to provide explanations of various phenomena connected with what is called primordialism, ethnicity, or nationalism, yet they have remained essentially descriptive or theoretical rather than explanatory.9 What are called ethnic or nationality conflicts may be fought under the banner of kinship, language, or religion to give practical meaning to the "cause," but one wonders if resistance to political exclusion and economic marginalization is not in actual fact what masquerades as ethnicity, nation-ness, or nationalism-the more so, when it is being deliberately fostered by the elite as a means of advancing their political goals of power acquisition.
If ethnicity is not biological or genetic, but something created that becomes a matter of identity over time, the following crucial questions could be raised: Can society produce leaders who transcend narrow affinities and personal gains, who build bridges, not fences, and who promote peaceful interaction and social justice by addressing the inequities that fuel the conflict? In other words, is it possible to promote social justice by meeting basic human needs and opportunities for social and economic betterment, irrespective of ethnic identity? What lesson could be learned from states like Malaysia that have been able to live together despite internal ethnic differences, and which have given all ethnic groups a role in running a country and offer incentives for cooperation?
The Forces of Disintegration in the Horn of Africa There are two major sources of disintegration in the sub-region: external and internal. There is the tendency of the nations of the Horn of Africa sub-region to avoid direct intervention into the internal conflicts of one of their neighbors but to arm and aid various internal parties in order to overthrow an existing order. In the recent past, this was done either to advance what is called the national interest, or to promote the vested interests of the major world powers, or the goals of one of the regional powers of the Middle East. Such actions have contributed to the observed rise in ethnic conflicts and separatism and rekindled mutual suspicion and hatred. Today, however, with the lessening of the direct hegemony of the global powers in the Horn of Africa, the sub-region seems to be at the mercy of Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, Iraq or Egypt. Is it, therefore, destined to continue to be a battlefield for Arab-Israeli confrontation, or of Sheite/Sunni hostilities?
There are also the numerous inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa which have only accelerated the disintegrative process at the national level. The nature of these conflicts and their consequences are too wellknown to require a recitation here.10 Suffice it to say that in only 28 years Ethiopia and Somalia, for example, fought 5 major wars and 12 minor ones, only to create new problems without solving the old ones.
The pressures that Sudan and Ethiopia brought on one another could also hardly be described as generating the spirit of good neighborliness. When funds and scarce resources are diverted from urgent development needs into armaments and when neighboring countries devote their energies and finances to ruin each other, the result can only be tragic, exacting a staggering toll in human life, destroyed property, large-scale displacement of peoples, and considerable retardation of growth and development efforts.
On the other hand, the internal forces of disintegration can be identified as the following:
1.Groups demanding complete independent sovereignty from the nation into which they were placed. Examples would be Eritrea11 and Northern Somaliland.12 2.Groups with legitimate grievances to which successive regimes lent deaf ears, and which are now busy debating the advantages of separatism against those of participation, for example, Southern Sudan, Kordufan, the Oromos, Tigrai, the Afars of Djibouti, and others. In the case of Eritrea, it should be noted that the Ethio-Eritrean problem is not an ethnic but a political problem. In fact, political mythology aside, in the 1940s and 1950s the majority of the Eritrean people wanted unity with Ethiopia. To be sure, in the British supervised elections of 1952, it was the Unionist Party-a party that campaigned not for autonomy, not for federation or independence, but for unconditional union with Ethiopia that won 32 of the 67 seats of the National Assembly, as against 18 for the Independence Front, 15 for the Muslim League of the Western Province, 1 for the National Party and 1 for the Independent Muslim League. Moreover, Unionist strength was also revealed on 29 April 1952, when the National Assembly chose for its President, the Secretary General of the Unionist Party, Tedia Bairu, by an overwhelming vote of 49 to H.14 However, in subsequent years, the faith and confidence of the Eritrean people in Ethiopia was shattered when Haile Sellassie's government abrogated Eritrea's United Nations sponsored federal status, suppressed political parties, banned the trade union movement, and reduced the region to a mere province of Ethiopia. Even after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974, the conflict could have been resolved if common sense and sanity had prevailed. But by and large, it failed. A number of reasons can be suggested for this.
First, there is a lack of dialogue and political interaction between Eritrean and Ethiopian intellectuals and their inability to articulate their differences and provide a common framework for action. In this respect, it could be said that some political cultures are essentially intolerant. In such a situation, analysis is often slanted to pander to a fixed truth and conclusions cannot be cross examined and verified through open inquiry. It seems that reason alone cannot determine political convictions. Emotions, passions, hearsay, and blind beliefs are equally important in forming opinions. Yet, it is those individuals who question the passions, who see issues on their merits rather than the sponsors, and who refuse to assert things to be true merely because they conform to an established prejudice or to some theoretical fad, who can make a difference. They are the bridges that link a society and who can serve as a barometer of its sanity. There remains the difficulty of finding a non-imperial legitimacy formula-one that might successfully integrate the country with a developmentalist rather than a preservationist policy. But, the ability to incorporate dissent and to centralize it through legitimation was not there. Moreover, the conflict also became an extension of the conflicts in the Middle East and those of the major world powers. In the absence of a common framework of discourse, both sides therefore resorted to history to prove their points of view. While one side searched for an answer to an existing problem in the distant past, the other side dismissed the past and insisted on an immediate solution to the conflict. In the process, to borrow the words of Bernard Lewis, "history has been menaced by an attitude which regards the past as another region to be 'liberated' by assault, and scholarship as another industry ripe for nationalization. "15 For the rest of Ethiopia, the cause of instability in the country had much to do with undue concentration of wealth and power at the centre and lack of development opportunities at the periphery. Given a committed leadership that encourages much greater social mobility, that takes adequate measures to rectify regional disparities in the allocation of development funds, and that has some political vision, Ethiopia could have evolved into a stable and prosperous country. But unfortunately, because of the political bankruptcy of its elite-an elite that failed to live up to its historical mission-Ethiopia fell into the hands of leaders who could not make the country's present different from its past and who left it in many ways worse than they found it.
There is also the present regime in Addis Ababa which calls itself a transitional government but is characterized by actions and inactions which contradict the role it fancies to play. For instance, the right of national self-determination to the point of separation has been enshrined in this government's political declaration and guarantees the right to secession from Ethiopia. This policy has resulted in escalating demands for ethnic self-determination. Furthermore, perhaps to facilitate the task of secession, administrative boundaries are to be redrawn to "reflect" linguistic groupings.16 Such an arrangement allocates 60 percent of Ethiopia to the Oromos and Somalis even when their combined population is less than one third of Ethiopia's total population. The fundamental absurdity of such a policy is that it fails to recognize the existence of millions of Ethiopians who are products of mixed marriages and who identify only with Ethiopia. Are they to be stateless? Ironic as it sounds, the Italian colonial administration had issued a similar map in 1937, consisting of five regions, namely: Eritrea, Amhara, Galla-Sidamo, Harrar, and Somali. The Italian objective was to weaken the resistance movement by intensifying ethnic differences. Since it was, however, found unworkable, the policy was abandoned. The present regime wants to detach, for example, the provinces of Humera and Wolkait from Gondar and incorporate them into Tigrai. The very same desire was also ad-vanced as early as 1975 by the Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which claimed one-fourth of the area of Gondar as Tigrean territory.
Gondar has a total population of 3,500,000 of which 185,000-a mere 5 percent-speak Tigrigna. But if the map is to be redrawn on linguistic grounds, it stands to reason that the boundary between Tigrai and Eritrea, for instance, is an imaginary boundary. The Tigreans, Afars, and Sahos never believe that they are moving into a different culture and society when they cross these borders. Hence, if the map is to be redrawn on linguistic basis, it would make more sense to incorporate the Eritrean provinces of Hamassien, Seraie, and Akele Guzaie with Tigrai than Wolkait and Humera which have never been part of Tigrai. It would also make more sense to incorporate the Sahos and Afars of Eritrea with those in Tigrai because they are the same people and speak the same language.
But as far as Humera and Wolkait are concerned, the Tekezie river, historically, has provided the boundary between Gondar and Tigrai. In fact, as late as 1847, Mansfield Parkyns observed that while Gondar extends from the river Tekezie to the frontiers of Sennar in the Sudan, the name Tigre is now applied to the whole country east of the Tekezie.17 Parkyns It appears that the current TPLF-dominated regime wants to annex these provinces to Tigrai to forward two objectives. First, to create a link with the Sudan for strategic reasons. The second is economic. Setit Humera contains one of the best alluvial soils, in the whole of Ethiopia. In the 1960s and 1970s, sesame, corn, cotton, oil seeds, pulses, millet, and sorghum were extensively produced in this excellent soil. Banks pumped millions of dollars in loans. Workers came from Gondar, Eritrea, Wollo and Tigrai. The province had became the second largest cotton producing area in Ethiopia next to the Awash Valley. The labor force had also increased from 13,000 in 1964 to 300,000 in 1972, and some 1,000 tractors were used for farming purposes. Agricultural production was so successful that for each $1 invested, the value of increase in crop production was $5. Average annual earnings in foreign exchange alone had reached $200 million. Experts had also estimated that with the building of dams and shifting into irrigated agriculture, production could be tripled. These facts explain why the TPLF wants to annex the region to Tigrai.
It seems that for the people of Gondar to give up these provinces would be like committing economic suicide. In a series of letters addressed to Melese Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government, many individuals have strongly protested what they call "ill-advised" and "misguided" action, which will lead to increased bloodshed. Dagnew Wolde Selassie, former Ethiopian Ambassador to Yemen, former Governor of Gondar Province and great, great grandson of Ras Woube, and Fetaye Asegu, a businessman, are among them.22
In the Amharic daily, Addis Zemen of 23 May 1992, the regime admitted there was vehement and widespread public opposition to the new administrative map of the regions and of its resulting desire to revoke the boundary set up. However, the concerted TPLF/EPLF military campaigns in Northern Gondar, the arbitrary arrests, the killing of innocent women, children, and old men, and the mass displacement of the population proves otherwise. The objective seems to change the demographic composition of the provinces in question in time to facilitate future settlement from Eritrea and Tigrai. To that end, a series of coercive proclamations have been issued ordering the people of Armatchiho, Tsegede, Which Way the Horn ofAfrica 147 Tselemt, and Wolkait to take instructions and administrative guidance from Mekelle, capital of Tigrai, rather than from the city of Gondar.23
Such a misguided policy has not gone unanswered. An effectively organized guerrilla force which calls itself-Kefagne-the Patriotic Front of Ethiopia is giving the TPLF a dose of its own medicine. It continues to fight the regime with devastating efficiency.
The policy of the present regime has ominous implications for Ethiopia's security and could have dire consequences for peace and stability in the area. An ethnic fuse has been lit and is spiraling out of control. A wave of unrest and insecurity prevails in Bale, Arussie, Southern Shoa, Issas, Muslim fundamentalists against Christians, and so on. 24 In effect, the reservoir of shared values and experiences, of common goodwill and interdependency, is dissipating to the point where the complete disintegration of Ethiopia has become a frightening prospect. Indeed, since ethnic identities are being state-sponsored at the expense of class identities, the regime has created conditions that could foster the complete breakup of Ethiopia. Whether this is being done consciously or otherwise, is immaterial. But the fact of the matter is, Ethiopia is disintegrating-and this disintegration is going to take others down as well, since Ethiopia's breakup will not occur within the confines of a sealed territorial container. The politically active forces in the area which seriously believe that they can benefit from the destruction of Ethiopia are lifting a huge stone only to drop it on themselves.
Eritrea has become independent. But what does political independence promise it? The amelioration of the economic conditions of the population, which require incredible resources, is a necessary component of domestic political legitimacy. But unfortunately, the resources are not available even with the best of intentions. Most donor governments are giving priority, and rightly so, to their own domestic problems. Eritrea has few natural resources. It will not be self-sufficient in food at least for a decade. Some 75 percent of the population depends on international food aid. 25 Its agriculture has been devastated by drought. There Over 20 percent of Eritrea's population is internally displaced. In Asmara, alone, some 50,000 youth are unemployed. There are also some 1 million Eritrean refugees who are yet to be repatriated and rehabilitated, for which the country needs substantial foreign assistance. Much of the infrastructure was damaged by the war. The government estimates that at least $2.5 billion would be needed to rebuild the roads, modernize agriculture and revive small industries. So far, however, only $100 million has been pledged for the next three years.26
Moreover, there is also the problem of ethnicity and conflicts with the opposition parties. The EPLF is accused of doing everything in its power to suppress and to liquidate any form of opposition, of embarking upon an extensive scheme of exterminating all Eritrean political organizations in the western lowlands, and of arbitrarily decreeing laws and implementing them without the consent of the people.27
Witnessing the ascendance to power of the essentially Christian dominated EPLF, the Arab countries are once again providing aid to the Muslim dominated ELF, in order to help it prevail over its adversary, the EPLF. Indeed, since Saudi Arabia considers Eritrea to be part of its security perimeter, it is taken aback in the face of a Christian-dominated EPLF, which has also established official relations with Israel. As if that was not enough, when Issaias Afeworki, the Eritrean President, went to Israel in February 1993 for a health checkup, the Saudis were deeply offended. The incident may be just a footnote to the evolving drama, but certainly the beginning of independent Eritrea's tragedy. Issaias Afewerki protested and appealed for a rational discourse, but in vain. It would be erroneous to assume that radical Muslims or Pan Arabists will compromise with an EPLF-led Eritrean government, and still less, permit it to Which Way the Horn ofAfrica 149 have normal relations with Ethiopia, Israel, or the United States. They did not invest so much in the "Arabism of Eritrea," merely to settle for a non-Arab, and a non-Muslim secular entity.
Although there are many imponderables, various probable scenarios could be elicited from the current situation: unable to withstand all the internal and external pressures, Eritrea may simply disintegrate; neighboring Sudan may claim and annex the eastern lowlands; and the entire Red Sea coast of Eritrea could be annexed by the Afar Democratic Union which has gone on record and declared its intention to unite all the Afar inhabited regions of the area. By invoking the Ethiopian Government's declaration on the right of secession, the Ogaden could declare its independence tomorrow and either establish an independent state or join the Somali Republic. If this is what seems to be in store for Ethiopia, what about Somalia? In so far as it is one of the least developed countries of Africa, Somalia shares Ethiopia's structural deformities. But beyond that, it has its own particular problems.
Ever since the 1960 coup d'état by northern military officers, former British Somaliland has fostered deep resentment against Mogadishu on account of being politically marginalized and economically peripherialized.32 Mogadishu will never accept this thesis. To be sure, over the last three decades, the south had the lion's share of development funds and representation in the critical organs of the state machinery. To this deep feeling of alienation has been added Siad Barre's orgy of killings and military excesses which devastated the north. As a consequence, the north has declared itself the Republic of Somaliland.
Muhammed Haji, writing from Riyadh, expresses his views with some feeling: the argument that Somaliland is neither politically nor economically viable fails to convince. In the history of the two countries, the south never supported the north. In fact, the opposite was true during the thirty years of the "ill-fated union." The leading foreign exchange earner of Somalia is livestock, and that is exported by Somaliland. Bananas are supposed to be the second foreign exchange earner, but in actual fact it is the remittances of expatriates working in the Gulf, 85 percent of which are from the north, that is the second foreign exchange The Sudan, too, is a troubled and inchoate state where the attempt to achieve national integration continues to be a serious problem. In this respect, as Richard Gray explains it:
The decisive, distinguishing factor between the North and the South seems to be a sense of belonging which has its roots in history and is conferred by birth. Completely isolated from the North until little more than a century ago, embittered by decades of subsequent hostility, and administered separately until the threshold of independence, the Southerner feels himself to be an African, while the ruling Northerner is proud of his Arab connection.35
The two regions fought bloody wars from 1956-1972. But after 16 years of civil war, the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1972 was signed by the two sides. The south was granted regional autonomy, a regional people's assembly and a High Executive Council that made the head of the council the vice-president of the Republic of the Sudan.
However, when the northern provinces were reorganized in 1980, the south lost a portion of its territory. The southerners say that this was a violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Furthermore, oil has been dis-covered in the south in commercial quantities. But since refining and processing capacity is located in the north, this has not contributed to the peace of the country.
Racial conflicts, religious differences and other factors that caused instability in the first place were never completely arrested. They have resurfaced. The situation has also been exacerbated by Khartoum's attempt to impose on non-Muslims, Koranic Sharia laws and punishment in accordance with hudud, which provides for amputation of limbs for crime and stoning to death for such offenses as adultery. If Khartoum insists on Sharia, the struggle for autonomy in the south may well graduate into a struggle for complete independence for southern Sudan, with all its implications for Kordufan, Darfur, the Bejas and Hadendawas of the Red Sea. In fact, a splinter group from the Sudan People's Liberation Army is already in shape to fight for Southern independence. Moreover, Sudan's attempt to promote political objectives outside its borders by non-democratic means, as well as its policy of allowing known terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate on its soil, and Hassan Turabi's dream of creating a series of Muslim states from the Nile to the Indian Ocean, are increasingly isolating Khartoum. Such a misguided policy can only accelerate the process of internal disintegration.
The Question of Viability
If the forces of disintegration succeed, the existing four countries of the Horn of Africa may give way to 101 others. Whether they will be viable or not will largely be determined by such questions as the existence of exploitable natural resources, population size and density, agriculture, political leadership, ability to borrow from abroad, literacy, cost of energy, level of urbanization, and so on. Indeed, economists suggest that minimum requirements for economic viability in developing countries include a population size of at least 10 to 15 million people,36 a reasonably low population growth rate, vast improvements in agriculture before or accompanying early industrialization,37 increased availability of health services and increased savings-in short, the need to capture the industrial revolution and building vast political, economic, and social institutions just to survive in a rapidly changing world. To say that none of these nations would be viable would only be to state the obvious. After all, the 36 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or the Fourth World-most of which are in Africa, far from developing, are actually either stagnating or declining. They are requiring more importation of food merely to feed their populations; in the process, they use wealth that could otherwise have been spent on development. They are also seeking outright charity.
In 1981, the European Economic Community (EEC) agreed to establish for LDCs an aid target reaching 0.15 percent of Gross National Product. If a Fifth World were to now emerge out of the disintegration of some of these Least Developed Countries, it will not bring with it the millennium. It can only help to increase poverty. Hence, as Harold Laski once remarked: "No geographical boundaries, however drawn, can possibly give territorial autonomy to each group of persons claiming distinctive characteristics, nor on economic grounds would such separation be desirable. "38 If civil and religious wars are to be avoided, and if foreign interference in the affairs of the peoples of the sub-region is to diminish, the territorial integrity of the countries of the sub-region will need tobe maintained. Furthermore, their administrative, economic, and political structures need to be made responsive to development needs and requirements and to the hopes and aspirations of their peoples, as well as to permit much greater social mobility.
Toward Federalism
Despite the claims of the champions of "ethnicity" and "secession," in the case of Ethiopia, for example, one could argue that as a result of migrations, interactions, conquests, trade, intermarriage, and so on, the diverse peoples of that country have created a geographic and cultural unit.39 One might even argue that the concept of "ethnicity" has little meaning as a guide to the grouping of peoples in Ethiopia. 40 In fact, there have been few periods in history when wars were fought in Ethiopia on ethnic basis. The fact that people professed different religions or spoke different languages has never been a serious barrier to living together. To look at Ethiopia's problems as strictly ethnic problems would therefore be to miss the point. As Clapham pertinently observes: political exclusion and marginalization does in fact provide a better guide than ethnicity to the incidence of insurgency.41 Moreover, the inspiring "cause" in Ethi-opian history has never been ethnicity, but regionalism-regionalism based on history, economic and particularly local forms of life which gave pride of place and regional ethos. The solution to the problem, therefore, lies in retaining the principles of regional autonomy, and not in proposing ethnic autonomy. We should note that 100 years ago, Oromos were not Oromos but Gugi, Arusi, or Boran. Forty years ago, Eritreans were not Eritreans, but Hamassien, Seraie, or Akele Guzaie.
Similarly, the Amharas were Gonderes or Gojames first, before considering themselves as Amharas.
The process of apartheid and bantustanization to which the country is presently subjected and the attempt to make territorial boundaries follow ethnic lines is nothing but a recipe for increased disaster. Ethiopia is a country where natural resources are not evenly distributed. The Afar region, for instance, has rock salt, potash, geo-thermal energy deposits along with cobalt, chromium and nickel and the huge commercial farms of the Awash Valley that produce cotton, sugar cane, tobacco and a variety of fruits and vegetables. Similarly, the Ogaden region has natural gas, petroleum, hydro-electricity, and the potentially irrigable huge lands of the Wabi Shibelle and the Juba basins. The Oromo region produces coffee, tea, several types of grains, livestock products, cement, gold, platinum, mica, coal, iron, as well as a variety of other products. If the existing arrangement were to prevail, those regions with favorable resource endowments would develop faster and eventually be in a position to dominate the weaker regions with all the consequences. To compartmentalize such a country on a linguistic basis would be a costly mistake. It will impede the optimum harnessing of human and non-human resources. It will be a serious barrier to factor mobility. It will also foster parochial relationships and slow down the development of rational and efficient forms of political and economic administration. One should draw the necessary conclusion from the Yugoslav experience. Hence, it may be better to go back to the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Ethiopia, as they existed prior to [1974] [1975] (Figure 1) . Admittedly, some changes and modifications can be made here and there on economic and administrative grounds. But by and large, it would be advisable to make the provinces ethnically heterogeneous rather than homogeneous.42 Ethiopia, itself, is a heterogeneous country. It consists of some 63 language groups. The provinces can only reflect this reality. Sim- A joint Ethio-Eritrean Ministerial consultative meeting, which took place in Asmara from 22-27 September 1993, reached agreement on a wide range of issues: economic, social, agricultural, energy, environment, monetary and financial, technical and scientific, security, defense, and foreign affairs. These mutual interests are to be pursued through joint projects and ventures to promote the gradual evolution of the two economies and societies into a higher level of integration. Agreement was also reached whereby Ethiopians and Eritreans are allowed to move freely in both countries without holding entrance and exit visas, and to reside in each other's countries for an unlimited period of time. 43 The government has also proposed a confederal relationship with Ethiopia.44
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In a recent interview with the Kuwait newspaper, Al-Watan, Issaias
Afewerki also disowned the Arabism of his country, dismissed the idea of Eritrea joining the Arab League as quite "strange," and reiterated the fact that there is no difference between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 45 If there are no differences between Ethiopians and Eritreans, and rightly so, if the aim of the leaders is indeed to promote a higher level of integration between the two economies and societies, why then dismantle existing arrangements? Why disintegrate what has already been integrated? Instead of proposing a confederation, why not settle for a federation? For this reason, conditions should be such that the idea of restoring Eritrea's former federal status should be earnestly contested, vigorously debated, and defended with equal talent and energy. But the question is, does such a condition exist? Does Ethiopian nationalism have an opportunity for political action in today's Eritrea? In any event, the same federal status would have to be extended to Tigrai, Shoa, Gondar, Wollega, Sidamo, Harrar and so on, in order to make Ethiopia a federal republic. Such a move will go a long way to restore the historically decentralized governmental and economic structure in which the provinces enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the imperial center and functioned in the form of a federation. 46 With regard to Somalia, we could also say the following: many in Northern Somaliland feel that their region's future must lie in close association with Djibouti and Ethiopia rather than with southern and central Somalia. 47 There is some merit to this argument. The economy of Hargeisa and Berbera is more oriented toward Jigiga and Dire Dawa in Ethiopia rather than toward Mogadishu, which is some 1,800 kilometers away from Berbera. However, it would be more practical for the northern and southern regions of the Somali Republic to form a federation. As we will see shortly, such an arrangement will not exclude contacts with Djibouti and Ethiopia. On the contrary, it will open the door for increased cooperation and interaction between Somalia and its neighbors. In fact, former President Abderahman, who contends that Somaliland is here to stay, recently pointed out that all the countries of the Horn-Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Sudan could establish economic cooperation and work together in many fields.
With regard to Djibouti, we could say that the situation in that country has been aggravated by the destabilization of Ethiopia and Somalia. Nevertheless, the essence of the conflict remains the historic rivalry between the Afars and Issas. The once influential Afars feel that they have become an underdog in their own country. In fact, since 1976 when Ali Aref lost power, the prominence of the Afars has declined considerably. Their demands for political pluralism are not therefore without some merit. In any event, the taking of speedy measures to address their grievances, coupled with the stabilization of Somalia and Ethiopia will, no doubt, help restore peace in Djibouti. Finally, there is the Sudan. If that country were to be a secular state, reorganize its administrative structure on a federal basis, and grant the south and the other regions such a status, the Sudan could also become a stable country. Stability and a policy of good neighborliness will create favorable conditions for sub-regional cooperation.
Why Sub-Regional Cooperation?
Having sorted out their domestic problems in a way that suits their conditions, if the four neighboring countries of the sub-region are to grow and to develop, they would have to cooperate between and among themselves. Why cooperation? Can they not develop separately? Why should their future necessarily depend on cooperation? These are legitimate questions.
The relation of national size to economic growth and efficiency is still in the realm of speculation. Nevertheless, some general observations can be made if we divide nations into small and large groupings. When economists speak of a small nation-small population multiplied by low per capita income-it is generally accepted that a country with a gross national product per capita of less than $400-$500 would be considered small because of the limited size of the domestic market and low income which preclude, the creation of effective demand. The economist regards the difference of the size of nations primarily from the point of view of the opportunities which any given size offers or fails to offer for securing the greatest possible economies and regularity of production, in so far as these depend on scale of production.48 On the other hand, a large country-large in the sense of a large gross national product or a large population multiplied by a relatively high per capita income and having a large area-may possibly have the opportunity to be relatively self-sufficient in many resources. It may have a much greater variety of minerals, of climate, of topography, and of mixture of land and water. This observation does not mean, however, that small nations possess no natural resources. All it means is that any one of them is likely to have a lesser variety. It is also equally recognized that in the absence of foreign trade, a large country can withstand external obstacles and develop more rapidly than a smaller one.
The Keynesian investment multiplier, for instance, stipulates the number of times a change in investment will magnify the resulting change of the national income. If the multiplier is three, an increase of $1 million in the amount of investment can lead to an increase of $3 million in the national income. In plain language, if capital investment increases, there will be a large change in income, and the initial investment induces further investment. To secure one unit of income, three times as much capital must be invested or three units of capital will result in a 1 percent increase in the national income. 49 Annual population growth in Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, has now reached 3 percent.50 To keep pace with such an increase, each would have to invest 9 percent of its national income. To get ahead of such a birth rate and to talk of a breakthrough, the amount of savings may have to go up between 12 percent and 15 percent of the national income devoted to productive capital. But how could any of these countries save this much when they cannot even feed themselves.51 How can they industrialize when the cost of industrialization is becoming more and more expensive? The usual prescription is to consume less and save more; in order to save more, tighten your belts. But what if they say: "Fine, give us the belts?" Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan are classified as the least developed of the "developing" world; average per capita GNP is less than $300. A high proportion of their populations live under conditions of mere subsistence and manufacturing contributes less than 10 percent to their total Gross Domestic Products.
In a world in which more and more governments are tending to be preoccupied with their own domestic social and economic problems, what options do these countries have, except sub-regional cooperation? With a combined area of 4 million square kilometers, a total population of over 80 million, an estimated gross sub-regional product of more than $17 billion, and complementary resource endowments, given the re-quired leadership and institutional setup for cooperation, these four neighboring countries could develop faster than they would individually.
In fact, as former U. N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar pointed out to the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly:
There are now a number of problems and realities with which only a large unity can effectively deal and where the requisite security of common interest can only be achieved through a collective effort of sovereign states. Many of these problems lend themselves best to sub-regional or regional cooperation of groups of nations with common interest. 52 Cooperation can help them to bring about a given degree and rate of industrialization at a lower cost than if it were attempted by these states separately. Such cooperation would enable them to create a wider market and to take advantages of the economies of scale and specialization. The possibilities of building a developed industrial infrastructure based on the common interests of the whole sub-region may increase considerably. Such cooperation should be viewed as a means of accelerating economic growth and of transforming economic structures by giving priority to one another's markets and by establishing a development pattern that is capable of linking the rate of domestic resource use to domestic demand.
Indeed, as Christopher Clapham aptly observes:
No individual economy within the Horn, nor even the economy of the Horn as a whole, has any plausible prospect of self-sufficiency.
And while regional integration is thus required under any successful economic order, this in turn needs to take the form of free trade across political boundaries, rather than the cumbersome and bureaucratized integration schemes through which African states have characteristically (and unsuccessfully) sought to compensate for their inadequate economies of scale. For instance, a sub-regional development office manned by experts from the four states and financed by contributions from these countries could be established. Among other things, it could identify development projects of a sub-regional nature, carry out detailed feasibility studies and explore the possibilities of their being financed from domestic and external sources. Such a group of technical experts should be allowed to develop habits of continuous consultation over a wide range of topics including agriculture, industry, human settlement, energy, transport and communications, water resources, food production, food security, afforestation schemes, controlled grazing, education, public health, scientific research, trade, airlines, shipping, and so on. As cooperation deepens and matures, some sort of a loose confederation54 of the four countries could be established to harmonize relations.
Some Possibilities For Cooperation
Very few scholars have studied the physical, cultural, and economic links of the countries of the Horn of Africa. In fact, the accent has always been on what divides them rather than on what unites them. The four countries operate as separate states, but they are also very interdependent. In physical characteristics such as climate, soils and rivers, they are essentially complementary. They also share similar ethnological characteristics and cultural fusion. Related population groups also straddle their common boundaries and spill over across international frontiers.55
While Ethiopia functions, for example, as a natural hinterland for Somalia and Djibouti, Somalia and Djibouti, in turn, are Ethiopia's natural outlets to the sea.56 Moreover, the harnessing of common rivers like the Blue Nile, the Awash, the Wabi Shibelle and the Juba-rivers that originate from Ethiopia but which are crucial for the livelihood of the peoples of the sub-region in terms of food production, nomadic grazing, irrigated agriculture, settlement of nomads, afforestation schemes, electricity production, and the like-require the cooperation of the four countries.57 Similarly, the Blue Nile river provides 80 percent of the water needs of both Egypt and the Sudan. The hydro-electric potential of the river has Gedaref (Sudan) and Doka (Ethiopia).59 Likewise, areas for cooperation between Somalia and the Sudan, between Djibouti and Somalia, and between the Sudan and Djibouti could be undertaken.
The East African Economic Community is often cited as a case to prove that economic cooperation and integration would not work in Africa. But what is conveniently overlooked and forgotten is that the Community failed not because it was African but because it was conceived, manned, and run by the British in the interest of Britain. The benefits of cooperation were also not fairly distributed, but largely favored Kenya. Uganda and Tanganiyka became raw material producers and suppliers to a rapidly industrializing Kenya. The countries of the Horn of Africa can benefit from the experiences of the East African Economic Community, in the sense that they should avoid such mistakes. The idea of cooperation and integration must originate from them. The projects must have a direct bearing on their growth and development efforts. They should also play a part in financing the projects. If external aid were to be required, the sources of aid should be diversified. The execution of the projects should involve, to a substantial extent, local technicians and experts. Moreover, the less developed in the group should be granted extensive advantages in accordance with the principle that "backward" members should be favored at the beginning in order to achieve a balance thereafter. In this way, these countries can assist in carrying out the economic programs of the PTA. 
